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Abstract 
 
This paper intends to explore the involvement of ISO, the world’s most iconic 
standard-setting institution, in the field of social responsibility, leading to the 
publication of the ISO26000 standard in November, 2010. Through several aspects 
of this experience, an almost decade-long process, I will show how ISO developed 
a new political structure aimed specifically at creating global policy, originating one 
the most sophisticated frameworks in existence to consensualise ‘universal’ socio-
political principles and infuse them with the legitimacy of a ‘global’ technocracy and 
liberal institutions. Moreover, I will use the latest ISO26000 experience to argue 
that conceptual and institutional minimalism, which favours ‘soft’ approaches 
towards global policy-making, paradoxically results from combining a technocratic 
aim for global compatibility with more participatory decision-making arrangements 
involving previously excluded socio-political actors. In that sense, ISO’s upgraded 
participatory mechanisms solved certain deadlocks suffered by previous initiatives 
only to affront and spark a new round of contradictions and consequences. Thus, I 
will conclude commenting on the intrinsic relationship between global standards, 
governance and complexity, and the difficulties of politically articulating 





Processes of international standardisation have accompanied the spread of trade 
and industry since the mid-19th century. Among such efforts, the establishment of 
cross-border regulation and principles standardising social activities has 
permanently featured a heated debate between those advocating strong 
enforceable legal rules and those preferring laxer and voluntary schemes. The 
development of doctrines of ‘social responsibility’, and lately, of organisations 
attributing to themselves the capacity to normalise this field - such as the UN 
Global Compact (GC), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and as will be shown, the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) - can also be understood as a 
contemporary continuation of such cleavages. Such doctrines simultaneously 
encompass many of the previous historical tensions of the Polanyian pendulum; 
the dialectic struggle between self-regulatory market forces and societal self-
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protective responses1, albeit with unique characteristics of the late 20th and early 
21st century: globalised concerns, a global capitalist system, and widespread 
international liberal institutions and values. In this paper I will use elements of the 
five-year long ISO26000 standard-setting experience to discuss some implications 
for global policy-making beyond state-mechanisms, and the difficulties of 
articulating international regulation, democratic politics, and technical and market 
rationalities. To do so, the paper is structured in three sections: presentation of the 
evolution and novel features of the ISO26000’s forum, detailed observations on the 
standard-setting process and debate, highlighting certain key developments, and a 
conclusion signalling some uncomfortable, but maybe unavoidable implications for 
global policy-making.   
 
 
The new ISO standard-setting structure: technocracy & political deliberation 
 
ISO was already a world-recognised organisation in the areas of process quality 
and environmental management systems, with a much longer history in industrial 
normalisation, well before ideas of social responsibility assumed their current form. 
However, despite the relative success of its 14000’s series on environmental 
management, ISO remained outside the main themes of the broader corporate 
responsibility debate. Not only in the 1970s and 1980s, when many of these ideas 
acquired publicity and were debated against Milton Friedman’s famous neoliberal 
motto2, but through the 1990s, when the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) became mainstream in media, corporate, and academic circles, and the 
notion of ‘sustainable development’ gained publicity after the publication of the 
1987 UN World Commission on Environment and Development ‘Our Common 
Future’ Report, and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in 
Rio de Janeiro. However, towards the end of the decade private ‘social’ standards 
outlining the responsibilities and best practices firms should adopt in relation to 
their activities, even when domestic law did not demand it, started to be promoted 
by elements within governments and civil society, leading to a number of 
independent NGOs launching their own codes, such as AA1000 by the British 
                                                 
1 Polanyi, K., 2001. The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time, 1944, 
Boston: Beacon Press.  
2 Friedman, M., 1970. “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, The New 
York Times Magazine, September, Extracted August 13th, 2010 from: 
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf. 
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AccountAbility in 1999 and SA8000 by the American Social Accountability 
International [SAI] in 2001, the latter directly based on ISO formatting. These 
efforts were close followed by the intervention of technical normalisation bodies in 
countries like Australia, France, Japan and Brazil – bodies that formed the 
constituency of ISO itself – setting national recommendations regarding corporate 
responsibility. It was at this moment, following the call by the UN-Secretary General 
for a new compact between society and business, and the official launch of the 
Global Compact programme, that sectors within ISO became interested in the 
matter3.  
In April 2001 ISO asked its Consumer Policy Committee (COPOLCO) to 
consider the viability of an international standard concerning CSR, understanding 
that the official shift in global policy had opened a window of opportunity for 
international organisations to engage with corporate regulation with greater 
legitimacy and political will. As a matter of fact, in January 2000 the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (now International Trade Union 
Confederation) plus other organised labour leaders had publicly endorsed the 
Global Compact project, stating that ‘...trade unions can strengthen corporate 
social responsibility and help build the social dimension of globalisation’4. 
In 2002, COPOLCO sent to the ISO board a report titled ‘The Desirability 
and Feasibility of ISO Corporate Social Responsibility Standards’5, recommending 
that ISO create a multi-stakeholder body to analyse further the implications of 
producing such standards and to engage in consultation with all affected parties 
concerning its findings. Among the key justifications was that the ongoing 
proliferation of standards projects both by recognised and non-recognised 
organisations could discourage corporate engagement with such topics, that 
corporations could exercise a leadership role and complement governmental 
activity in particular in the developing world, and that the new ISO standard would 
                                                 
3 Annan’s global ‘quiet revolution’ advocated the growing participation of non-state actors in global 
and domestic governance. It interlocked with quests for more transparent, accountable and 
enabling political mechanisms and market-based approaches to economic management, which 
made continuous participation of civil society and business fundamental for addressing both 
domestic and international issues. See Annan, K., 1998. “The Quiet Revolution”, Global 
Governance, 4, 123-138. 
4Joint UN-ICFTU Statement on the Global Compact, in 
http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991209381&Language=EN (Accessed October 
22nd, 2010). 
5 See Full Report on www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile?llNodeId=22124&llVolId=-2000 (Accessed May 
19th, 2011). 
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build on the existing quality and environmental management system series6. The 
report recognised that this move would inaugurate a new era in ISO 
standardisation, as it would imply a shift away from technical-oriented standards to 
softer, more variable and less precise areas of corporate action, albeit benefiting 
from ISO’s practical experience on management and industrial issues.  
ISO was well aware of the weaknesses of private business regulation, 
mainly expressed in a legitimacy gap and associated regime competition. These 
were a consequence of a range of factors, such as normative unilateralism, 
divergent standard-setting logic and orientation, lack of transparency and 
institutional atomisation, which by the beginning of the century embodied a prolific 
range of self-regulatory corporate programmes, sectoral labelling initiatives and 
multi-stakeholder standards varying from country to country as well as within 
industries7. Considering this situation by 2003 ISO decided to adopt a similar 
approach to that followed by other private initiatives and professed by the UN’s 
‘public-private partnership’ policy line: it extended participation to other social 
constituencies in its standard-setting process and created an expanded multi-
sectoral and multi-national Strategic Advisory Group to conduct the final feasibility 
evaluation. This Group worked for 18 months until completing a detailed report on 
the potential of social standardisation within ISO, and the procedures to be 
followed to avoid deadlocks in the development of the standard, consequently 
leading to the launch of the project in June 20048. 
Private governance frameworks had already innovated with this approach in 
the nineties, including in their structures and models participants from organised 
labour, civil society, business associations and academia. The US Fair Labour 
Association (FLA), created in 1996 by the Clinton administration was composed at 
the time by 13 firms, several NGOs and 170 university affiliates, while the UK 
European Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) counts among its members the British 
Trade Union Confederation, other global Unions, plus a dozen NGOs including 
                                                 
6 See Resolution on  
www.iso.org/iso/livelinkgetfile?llNodeId=22125&llVolId=-2000 (Accessed May 19th, 2011). 
7 Hassel, A., 2008. “The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance Regime”, Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 21, 2, 231-251; Urminsky, M., 2001. 
“Self-regulation in the workplace: Codes of Conduct, social labelling and socially responsible 
investment”, Working Paper No 1, ILO Management and Corporate Citizenship Programme; Vogel, 
D., 2008. “Private Global Business Regulation”, Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261-282.  
8 See full report on 
http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/corporate_social_responsibility/WorkingReportonSR.pdf (Accessed May 
19th, 2011). 
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Oxfam GB, Care International UK, Christian Aid and the Fairtrade Foundation9. 
However, these first-generation projects remained mostly centred on national 
constituencies. Later ones, such as the Global Compact and GRI, developed multi-
stakeholder international boards to lead their agenda, though still with marked 
sectoral orientation: the former toward large firms and international bodies10, and 
the latter to specialised groups such as accounting firms, certification bodies and 
environmental experts11.  
ISO realised as well that its ‘engineering-laden’ approach to standardisation, 
based on voluntary consensus and praised for embodying such values as 
practicality, rationality, universalism and democratic-deliberation, could prove an 
obstacle for the new enterprise12. This has been the previous experience of many 
traditional international organisations, where their bureaucratic and political 
structures emerged as limitations for developing international frameworks on social 
and corporate issues. These arrangements struggle when facing the diversity of 
social and cultural values, the different (and often antagonistic) political systems in 
place, the reluctance of governments to legislate on such matters, and the lack of 
an accepted body of knowledge shared by interested parties13. For instance, the 
UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Enterprises was abandoned after decades 
of political deadlock, and the ILO’s ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’, launched in 1977 and amended in 
2000 and 2005, had limited practical use. The last attempt to develop a piece of 
officially-recognised international social legislation was the campaign to include an 
ILO-based social clause within the WTO framework, and thus provide coercive 
                                                 
9 See http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/our-members. The website also claims that in 2008 the 
initiative was able to reach to 40.000 suppliers, half of them being first-tier suppliers (that is, directly 
linked with one of the 50 companies that signed ETI), and 13,000 second-tier (suppliers of first-tier 
suppliers).  
10 Ruggie, J., 2001. “global_governance.net: The Global Compact as Learning Network”, Global 
Governance, 7, 371-378. 
11 Levy, D., Brown, H., de Jong, M., 2010. “The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The 
Case of the Global Reporting Initiative”, Business and Society, 49, 1, 88-115; Kell, G., Levin, D., 
2002. “The Evolution of the Global Compact Network: An Historic Experiment in Learning and 
Action”, Paper presented at The Academy of Management Annual Conference ‘Building Effective 
Networks’, August, Extracted from: http://unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.5/denver.pdf. 
12 Loya, T., Boli, J., 1999. “Standardization in the World Polity: Technical Rationality over Power”, in 
Thomas, G., Boli, J. (Eds.), 1999, Constructing world culture: international nongovernmental 
organizations since 1875, Stanford: Stanford University Press; Castka, P., Balzarova, M., 2008. 
‘The impact of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 on the standardisation of social responsibility – an inside 
perspective’, International Journal of Production Economics, 113, 74-87; Yates, J., Murphy, C., 
2009. The International Organization for Standardization – Global Governance through voluntary 
consensus, Routledge. 
13 Risse, T., 2006. “Transnational Governance and Legitimacy”, in Benz, A., Papadopoulus, I. (Eds), 
Governance and Democracy – Comparing National, European and International Experiences, 
London, 179-199. 
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mechanisms to labour legislation. However, the social clause was defeated by 
‘North-South divide’ polarizations, the general tag referring to the opposing 
interests of developed and developing countries, that emerged in the 1996 
Singapore Round and continued until its abandonment14. Soon afterwards the 
whole ILO convention-setting process was dropped with the publication of the 1998 
“Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up”, 
which acknowledged that state-centred measures were ineffective to tackle labour 
issues and corporate behaviour in a globalised world.  
Against this background, the Advisory Group report maintained the 
organisation’s typical liberal humanist spirit, which considers that politically-neutral 
scientific knowledge is a fundamental driver of human progress and peace, but 
introduced several novel recommendations regarding how the topic of CSR should 
be standardised. First, it aimed for creating a norm capable of encompassing all 
the initiatives in existence in the field of corporate social responsibility, 
sustainability and international socio-environmental conventions: the goal was 
normalising, both conceptually and institutionally, an atomised and un-structured 
field through an institutional debate previously non-existent beyond narrow 
academic and specialist circles. Second, as part of this standardisation logic, it 
decided to drop the ‘corporate’ from the notion of CSR, the mainstream version of 
the concept, and envisioned a standard applicable to all types of organisation and 
not only private corporations. Third, the understanding of the ‘social’ in SR was 
conceived as overlapping and extending over human and labour dimensions, the 
traditional arena of the ILO, and addressing the ‘triple bottom line’ of the 
sustainability discourse which included environmental and economic concerns. 
Finally, it projected taking into account the situation of SMEs, frequently excluded 
from existing frameworksincluding GRI’s guidelines, as mostly large public 
companies produce corporate reports, as well as the GC, criticised for being an 
‘elite’ corporate club for those transnational corporations (TNCs) with access to 
international forums and organisations15. 
After the presentation of this report, the ISO Technical Management Board 
outlined the parameters for the new forum, the ISO26000 Working Group, which 
would be in charge of developing the norm. The structure of this group introduced 
                                                 
14 O’Brien, R., 2004. “Globalisation, Imperialism and the Labour Standards Debate”, in Munck, R. 
(Ed.), 2004, Labour and Globalisation: Results and Prospects, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.  
15 Ruwet, C., Tamm Hallström, K., 2007. How are the contents of multi-stakeholder standards 
shaped? The danger of using stakeholder categories as analytical tools – the case of the ISO 
26000 standard on social responsibility, 23rd EGOS colloquium, July 2007, Vienna, Austria.  
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a combination of mechanisms which differed from existing decision-making 
arrangements, albeit the operationalisation of these parameters and the 
establishment of the procedures was an iterative task: the first meeting in Bahia in 
2005 was reported to have been chaotic16. ISO was aware that its structure was 
excessively weighted towards three main groups: leading private firms; the national 
standardisation bodies more familiar with ISO’s management systems, and key 
service providers; large management consultancies, certification and auditing firms, 
all groups composed by actors generally based in the global North17. A study 
concluded that, by 2004, Western European standardisation bodies represented 
12% of ISO membership but made up almost half of the voting members in 
technical committees, while African countries, for instance, constituted 30% but 
only participated in 4% of the committees18. Such functioning, accepted in relation 
to industrial standards where best practices and technical knowledge converged in 
the role of large firms and developed countries, was a threat against the 
universality of the new ‘social’ project. The new ISO Working Group intended to 
expand both the celebrated tripartism of the ILO Assembly, still the sole officially 
recognised body able to set international labour norms but where only corporatist 
groups have representation, and the arrangements adopted by the latest industry-
oriented regulatory initiatives, in particular the narrow epistemic communities 
existing behind projects such as GRI, the International Social and Environmental 
Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL) and others technical associations19. 
ISO combined its traditional functioning around networks of functional 
expertise with the extended participation of other types of experts beyond 
engineers and business practitioners. It also maintained its traditional voluntary 
consensus standard-setting procedure, which had worked effectively in industrial 
regulation and international trade legislation (similar to the process used in the 
                                                 
16 Ward, H., 2010. “The ISO 26000 international guidance standard on social responsibility: 
implications for public policy and transnational democracy”, 2nd Draft, September, Foundation for 
Development and Sustainable Development, London. Available on 
http://www.fdsd.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/ISO26000_and_transnational_democracy_Sept_draft.pdf (Accessed May 19th, 
2011). 
17 Yates, J., Murphy, C., 2009. The International Organization for Standardization – Global 
Governance through voluntary consensus, Routledge; Tamm Hallström, K., 2008. “ISO expands its 
business into Social Responsibility”, in Boström, M., Garsten, C. (Eds), 2008, Organizing 
Transnational Accountability, Edward-Elgar Publishing. 
18 Heires, M., 2008. ‘The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’, New Political 
Economy, 13, 3, 357-367. 
19 To see a good argument in support of the latter see, Murphy, C., Yates, J., 2010. ‘ISO 26000, 
Alternative Standards, and the ‘Social Movement of Engineers’ involved with Standard-Setting’, in 
Gibbon, P., Ponte, S., Vestergaard, J. (Eds), 2011 (Forthcoming), Governing through Standards: 
Origins, Drivers, and Limitations, Palgrave Macmillan.  
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WTO). Six interest groups were defined as sources of expertise for the themes to 
be covered by the new standard: Consumers, Governments, Industry, Labour, 
NGOs, and Service, Support, Research and Others (SSRO), the category grouping 
members of academia, standards institutes, consultancies and think-tanks. This 
typology reflected already a different stance to most contemporary private 
initiatives: it explicitly recognised a role for governments in private standardisation, 
the actor sidelined in the new wave of governance projects seeking precisely to 
minimise state involvement. But it also differed from established international 
organisations and forums as it gave an equal footing to civil society, labour and 
business actors, the latter two sectors with more consolidated bodies of 
representation. It also innovated by subdividing civil society among several interest 
groups: consumer associations, a category generally more economic than political, 
were distinguished from other NGOs and from academia, foundations and think-
tanks.  
However, while it is common for private governance initiatives to select their 
participants by sector but disregarding nationality - for instance, within GRI each 
stakeholder group selects their representatives on a regional level20 - ISO kept the 
selection process in the hands of the national standardisation institutes; 
participants volunteered and were appointed by each national institute according to 
expertise, willingness and representativity by sector. In this sense, ISO retained a 
more conservative UN-ILO type of arrangement: each national constituency was 
allowed one expert and one observer, but only the experts had voting rights in 
plenary meetings. Additionally, the procedure still privileged a Westphalian 
hierarchy where the different constituencies had to agree on a common national 
position in order to vote. This had the consequence of forcing ‘compromises’ inside 
delegations, which had to accommodate the different weight each sector had in 
each country: aspects such as the independence of civil society, the strength of 
business lobbying, the development of the certification industry, governmental 
apathy, etc. This approach was criticised by the more progressive sector of the 
social responsibility movement for incentivizing a minimum-common-denominator 
style of consensus21, and by international business for weakening the formation of 
                                                 
20 GRI uses only five constituencies: Business, Labour, Civil Society, Inter-governmental Agencies 
and Mediating institutions, while the Global Compact classifies its constituencies as Firms, Business 
Associations, Labour, Civil Society, Academia, Public Sector and Cities. 
21 Murphy, C., Yates, J., 2010. ‘ISO 26000, Alternative Standards, and the ‘Social Movement of 
Engineers’ involved with Standard-Setting’, in Gibbon, P., Ponte, S., Vestergaard, J. (Eds), 2011 
(Forthcoming), Governing through Standards: Origins, Drivers, and Limitations, Palgrave Macmillan. 
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transnational sectoral positions. On the other hand, ISO maintained its structure of 
local mirror committees, coordinated by each national standardisation body, with 
the tasks of following the international process, consulting national interested 
parties, formulating a national view point and promoting local implementation22. It 
was from these mirror committees that national delegates were selected. 
Finally, the Westphalian hierarchy was further sustained as interested 
international organisations and networks were grouped in a separate non-national 
category, allowed to appoint two experts each, but with restricted voting rights: in 
particular, they were not allowed to vote on the final version of the draft, only to 
provide opinions. This is a particularly unusual approach to private international 
regulation, which is considered to be the realm of exactly this type of actor. Forty 
two of these organisations, denominated ‘Liaison’, participated in the process: an 
heterogeneous group including private standards actors such as the Fair Labour 
Association, the GC, GRI, SAI, and ISEAL, international corporatist groups such as 
the ILO, ICC , ITUC, IOE and WBCSD23, and international and surpranational 
bodies such as the OECD, the European Commission and the WHO. By 2010, 
70% of the total individual participants belonged to national delegations from 
almost 100 countries. 
The forum thus constituted a new type of evolving institutional arrangement 
explicitly designed to create international policy alongside the figure of the State. 
The framework not only moved away from previous ISO functioning, but also 
differed from other governance schemes such as tripartism, multilateralism, multi-
stakeholder standardisation and self-regulation, all of them institutional 
developments intended to augment, in diverse contexts, the legitimacy and efficacy 
of increasingly complex norm-setting processes. Hence, ISO’s arrangement 
intended to amalgamate the legitimacy emanating from both technical 
specialisation and liberal democratic procedures, and create a global assembly for 
both domestic and international constituencies. ISO also directly engaged with 
mechanisms to moderate the ‘North-South’ divide: the cleavage that had risen as a 
blockade to international regulation in trade and labour after the Cold War. In 2004, 
before the formation of the main Working Group, the ISO Secretariat decided to 
establish a combined chair to lead the creation of the standard, integrated by two 
standardisation bodies from a developed and a developing country. This new 
                                                 
22 See http://www.iso.org/iso/supporting_stakeholders.pdf (Accessed May 19th, 2011). 
23 Respectively: International Chamber of Commerce; International Trade Union Confederation; 
International Organisation of Employers and World Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
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leadership strategy, called ‘twining’, resulted in the selection for the first time in ISO 
history of two co-convenors: Sweden’s Standards Institute SIS and the 
Normalisation Institute of Brazil ABNT, a nation with a highly organised social 
responsibility sector and even a national norm published in 200424. Furthermore, 
the composition of the delegations was subjected to multiple balancing rounds: 
through the eight plenary meetings that took place between 2005 and 2010 the 
composition was altered to obtain a more egalitarian distribution among experts in 
terms of gender (reaching a 60% male – 40% female distribution), constituency, 
and region of origin. By 2009, 17% belonged to industry, 13% to Government, 11% 
to NGOs, 7% to consumers, 6% to Labour and 46% to SSRO, with over 60% of the 
experts belonging to developing countries (from an initial proportion of 47%)25. 
Moreover, translation Task Forces covering nine languages, including Spanish, 
Portuguese, Korean, Chinese and Arabic, were put in place by the experts 
themselves in parallel to the English-held debates, and not a posteriori publication, 
so as to ameliorate conceptual and cultural disagreements as the contents were 
discussed26. The plenary meetings themselves were held in different locations over 
four continents, in order to facilitate attendance by local participants, from Bahia 
and Bangkok to Quebec, Copenhagen and Sydney. Finally, all the working files of 
the project were made publicly available online27.  
In summary, this section has explained the logic behind ISO’s involvement 
in the development of an international standard of social responsibility, the main 
features of the novel institutional structure set to do so, and how this structure 
responded to ISO’s interpretations of its surrounding context and the defects of 
previous initiatives. The next section focuses on some of the intended and 
unintended consequences of this arrangement, and provides a theoretical 




                                                 
24 Alonso, V., 2006. “Avances en la discusión sobre la ISO 26000 en América Latina: antecedentes 
para apoyar el proceso ISO en la region” [Advances on the discussion over IS0 26000 in Latin 
America: Antecedents to support the ISO process in the region], ECLAC – GTZ Proyect Document, 
United Nations. 
25 ISO, 2010. Report of the Secretariat, Agenda Item 6, Document N183, 8th Meeting Copenhagen, 
Denmark. Extracted from: 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=9167811&objAction=Open&vernum=1.  
26 The author attended the Spanish meetings in the Copenhagen Forum.  
27 See http://www.iso.org/sr_archives (Accessed November 2nd, 2010). 
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Technocracy & political deliberation: compromises, minimalist consensus & 
convergence 
 
The ISO26000 Working Group can be said to envision a type of international 
technocratic plebiscitary democracy. This section of the paper reviews the political 
compromises that are expected to emerge under this kind of arrangement. The 
Working Group forced many national and international actors to bargain with each 
other for the first time: private standardisation bodies entered in contact with local 
labour groups, environmental NGOs exchanged information with South American 
business representatives, while Scandinavian consumer activists discussed with 
Islamic public officials28. These exchanges carried several unexpected 
consequences worth reviewing. Fundamentally, resulting from the forced nation-
based consensus mechanism and the expanded social constituencies, there was a 
shift towards consensual minimalism to solve political blockages, an outcome that 
often disappointed many groups and analysts.  
Such a tendency was present from the project’s inception: originally ISO 
intended to produce a certifiable management standard, the format assumed by its 
previous successful 9000s and 14000s series. Nonetheless, it switched to a 
weaker ‘guidance’ version after an internal inter-sectoral debate started in 2004. In 
this debate, the ILO, international labour and several NGOs were strongly against 
creating a certifiable social norm, partly concerned by the deficiencies of a profit-
oriented certification industry. TNCs’ representatives were also divided on the 
matter: many large TNCs opposed it claiming that they already possessed 
solutions to deal with these issues, while the ICC-IOE front rejected any additional 
non-voluntary regulatory mechanism that could restrict free trade29. Some 
developing countries were concerned, expectedly, that the new standard could 
become a formal requirement on suppliers or to access developed markets, and 
were more interested in obtaining greater participation in the standard-setting 
process as a whole30. Thus, expectations varied within each sector and not only 
vis-a-vis business, as is commonly assumed. Organisations like the ILO, GRI and 
                                                 
28 The author participated in a workshop where a Norwegian private consultant sat across from a 
Malaysian labour official and two Chinese NGO members. 
29 ICC, 2004. Joints views of ICC and the IOE on the recommendations of the ISO Advisory Group 
on Social Responsibility, May. Extracted from: http://iccwbo.org/home/business_society/ICC-
IOE%20views%20for%20ISO%20Conference.pdf. 
30 Castka, P., Balzarova, M., 2008. ‘The impact of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 on the standardisation 
of social responsibility – an inside perspective’, International Journal of Production Economics, 113, 
74-87. 
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different national governments, in contrast to technical agencies, were not only 
concerned with the technical dimensions of creating a new directive, but also with 
protecting their own political turf and obtaining new resources31. Under such 
conditions ISO’s technical board opted for a ‘compromise’ not to risk the outcome 
of the process, and be able to publish a standard in an arena where both the UN 
and the ILO had not been successful. 
Therefore, despite its more detailed normative ambition, ISO preferred to 
emphasise the voluntary character of the project and rejected the labelling and 
certification mechanism, a salient aspect of its prior standard series. Labelling has 
been a key feature of ‘non-state governance’ and is considered by several authors 
as an ‘evolutionary’ response to previous regulatory deadlocks32, used in a 
multitude of established guidelines and frameworks created by organisations such 
as FSC, SAI, ETI and Fair Labour Association. ISO26000, in contrast, rejected the 
creation of official certificatory bodies to monitor compliance, certify firms and 
facilities, or provide consulting. Not only this, but the guidelines were decided to be 
offered freely downloadable from the internet. Hence, as a guidance standard 
ISO26000 cannot be legally certified either by ISO or any other third-party, nor can 
it be subjected to customary law by nations or as a basis for international 
procedures, as was the case with ISO 9000 and 14000 within the WTO and the 
EU, which became on many occasions de facto market requirements. This decision 
was criticised severely by different social sectors even to the last plenary meeting, 
from labour unions and civil society which considered it business-favouring, to 
consulting and certificatory organisations which saw their activities threatened.  
It is possible to affirm that this liberal policy, generally attributed to the lobby 
of the sector most favoured by it – i.e.: business – was instead a result of the 
greater normative ambition of the project and the diversification of the participants: 
it was understood by ISO as a necessary condition to achieve consensus. The 
same can be argued of another typical compromise witnessed during the last 
Copenhagen Plenary Meeting, where a temporary deadlock erupted around the 
use of the term ‘sexual orientation’ within the draft of the norm, in order to 
enumerate unacceptable discriminatory practices. Delegations from Muslim 
countries formed a bloc and were able to deter its inclusion in the final draft,  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Bartley, T., 2010. “Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation”, Forthcoming, Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.), 
Handbook of Politics of Regulation. Extracted from:  http://www.indiana.edu/~tbsoc/handbook.pdf 
(Accessed May 2nd, 2011); Berstein, S., Cashore, 2007. “Can non-state global governance be 
legitimate? An analytical global framework”, Regulation & Governance, 1, 1-25. 
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arguing that it conflicted with religion, national laws and culture, and obtained its 
replacement by the more ambiguous term ‘personal relationships’. This was 
perceived as a defeat by many civil society groups and representatives from 
Western countries to the pressures of conservative sectors, although it is also 
evident that it was an outcome facilitated from the opening and ‘democratisation’ of 
the forum rather than the actual influence of the latter groups.  
Another of the implications revealed by this new political arrangement is that 
many national and sectoral positions were articulated as the debate evolved and 
were not outlined prior to it. This allows questioning the application of conceptual 
approaches such as those of rational-actor analysis, which assume pre-assigned 
interests and expectations for each type of social actor, and highlight instead the 
role of communicative and social processes with focus on meaning construction, 
learning and ideological co-optation. Ruwet & Tamm Hallström observed that many 
participants even changed their a priori positions. This was the case for SMEs, 
which entered the process on the conception that social responsibility was purely a 
concern of large companies33. Some civil society representatives that participated 
hoping to impose harder regulations over firms discovered they had a much 
weaker discursive and practical experience when they too became an object of 
standardisation, as the removal of the ‘corporate’ orientation gave place to wider 
applications of this discourse. Moreover, the debate fostered the intertwinement of 
a business-based vocabulary (populated by terms such as stakeholder, value 
chain and operating practices), popular in related literature and media, with notions 
more frequently associated with international conventions and political analysis 
(rule of law, accountability, gender equality, complicity, etc)34. Thus, these authors 
concluded that the widening of the social and political participation in ISO standard-
setting, which was initially approached combining the ‘moral’ authority of social 
movements, the financial resources of corporations, or the hierarchical authority of 
the ILO, generated new positions of power emerging from familiarity with its own 
technical vocabulary and procedures –‘enclaves’35 – that gave place to other types 
of distinctions and hierarchies. 
                                                 
33 Ruwet, C., Tamm Hallström, K., 2007. How are the contents of multi-stakeholder standards 
shaped? The danger of using stakeholder categories as analytical tools – the case of the ISO 
26000 standard on social responsibility, 23rd EGOS colloquium, July 2007, Vienna, Austria.  
34 Some of these concepts were subject to difficult translation into other languages beyond their 
English matrix, as stakeholders, rule of law and even governance itself. 
35 Ruwet, C., Tamm Hallström, K., 2007. How are the contents of multi-stakeholder standards 
shaped? The danger of using stakeholder categories as analytical tools – the case of the ISO 
26000 standard on social responsibility, 23rd EGOS colloquium, July 2007, Vienna, Austria. 
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Nonetheless, the production of ‘new’ power positions also fostered 
collaboration among civil society and social groupings within and among countries: 
for instance, the Brazilian civil society ‘expert’ attended as the representative of a 
specially-created NGO Articulation Group [GAO ISO 26000], a virtual network 
created in 2006 to coordinate a civil society-wide position in Brazil in relation to the 
development of the international norm36. In this sense the ISO26000 forum has 
triggered certain associational interest among civil society groups given the 
necessity to face other social sectors with higher degrees of organisation. 
Historically this is not unprecedented: organised labour and employers groups 
consolidated with the creation of the ILO in the 1920s and its reform in the 1940s, 
and the UN Global Compact and other corporate regulatory projects have 
contributed to the renewal and organisation of international business and its 
associations as political actors37. 
Eventually the final standard was approved by majority voting, even though 
the final draft was rejected by five national delegations on different grounds, 
including those of the US and India38. Several Liaison organisations rejected it as 
well, but did so based on different and sometimes opposing reasons. Organised 
business, in groups such as the ICC, the IOE and BIAC39, frequently accused of 
co-opting private governance initiatives, did not provide formal backing to the final 
version as they considered it overly detailed and complex, too inviting to the 
possibility of becoming certifiable in the future, and having privileged national over 
sectoral hierarchies40. The International Federation of Standard Users rejected the 
norm disagreeing with, among other things, ISO’s decision to offer the standard for 
free. Other organisations, such as GRI, Transparency International, SAI, the 
                                                 
36 See http://www.gao.org.br/ (Accessed March 22nd, 2011). 
37 Several authors addressed the phenomenon of business as an international political actor and 
the rise of business diplomacy. See Kelly, D., 2001. “The Business Diplomacy: The International 
Chamber of Commerce meets the United Nations”,  Working Paper, Centre for the Study of 
Globalisation and Regionalisation, Warwick University, May, Extracted October 11th, 2010 from: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2001/wp7401.pdf; Hocking, B., 
Kelly, D., 2002. “Doing the business? The International Chamber of Commerce, the United Nations, 
and the Global Compact”, in Cooper, A., English, J., Thakur, R. (Eds), 2002, Enhancing global 
governance: Towards a new diplomacy?, Tokyo, United Nations University Press. 
38 For instance, the US rejection was based on understanding that the final draft was too long and 
complex, and oriented mainly to the needs of TNCs. The Indian position was justified on the 
recognition granted in the standard’s Annex to private and commercial certification programmes and 
initiatives, arguing that this clashed with the principles behind ISO26000 itself. See 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/9779426/N196_Result_of_ballot_ISOFDIS_26000.pdf?func=doc.F
etch&nodeid=9779426 (Accessed November 2nd, 2010). 
39 Business and Industry Advisory committee to the OECD.  
40 The main representative of SMEs, the European Office of Crafts, Trades and Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises for Standardisation, also withhold support based on the complexity of the 
standard for use by small companies. 
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European Commission and ITUC voted in favour, though labour expressed 
reservations with setting a precedent for quasi-official public policy-making 
involving constituencies which are not formally democratic and representative41. 
Some local unions, such as Argentine ones, rejected even the legitimacy of the 
whole process based on this consideration, as for them social and labour norms 
were the exclusive arena of the ILO42. 
This paper argues that the consensual minimalism that enabled the 
resolution of these divergent stances should not be understood as a ‘defect’ of 
anachronistic nation-based arrangements when dealing with global issues. Rather, 
it is the product of two systemic processes that ISO triggered when it expanded 
and re-politicised its structure: the de-differentiation of distinct functional 
programmes, and the growing scalar complexity of global governance, two notions 
that should be understood from the conceptual base of Niklas Luhmann’s systemic 
social theory43. The first refers to the (intended) articulation under a common code 
– what is and what  is not ‘socially responsible’ – of a wide array of previously 
independent or semi-independent ‘technical’ domains: environmental regulation, 
labour and human rights, financial governance, management practices, human 
resource management, product and process design, etc. This code running behind 
the ISO project proposed that such themes should be treated by a new type of 
technique, crystallised in specialised norms and principles, which not only 
superseded previous ones but articulated them as dimensions of an overarching 
discourse. On the other hand, growing scalar complexity refers to the process 
whereby as new scales and temporalities emerge or gain institutional relevance, 
social forces struggle to develop mechanisms to link and coordinate them, which in 
turn leads to further cleavages and interest in managing and articulating the new 
mechanisms, producing even greater complexity, scales and temporalities44. In this 
case, this was operationalised by an expanding set of institutions that functionally 
overlapped with pre-existent local and international organisations, further 
convoluting the institutional and normative environment, especially at the 
                                                 
41 A traditional criticism of that organised labour uses against against civil society. See files in 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/9781660/x_Comments_received_on_ISO_FDIS_26000.zip?func=
doc.Fetch&nodeid=9781660 (Accessed October 28th, 2010). 
42 This comment is derived from ongoing research beyond the scope of this paper. 
43 A detailed treatment of the use of such theory is beyond the scope of this piece. For a brief 
introduction to it, see Luhmann, N., 1986. “The autopoiesis of social systems”, Journal of 
Sociocybernetics, 6, 2008, 84-95. For more detailed treatment, see Luhmann, N., 1995. Social 
Systems, 1984, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
44 See Jessop, B., 2008. State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach, Polity Press. 
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international level, where no ultimate source of authority exists, and fueling the 
creation of new bodies, forums and agreements.  
ISO26000 approached social responsibility both as a theme that could be 
subjected to technical standardisation, and as a wider socio-political forum for 
debating and consolidating global values. The previous analyses, and the positions 
in the final voting round, confirm that the standard was achieved by a combination 
of international technical debate, political bargaining and democratic voting 
procedures. But the articulation of these cleavages required diluting the 
specialisation and restrictiveness of the discourses involved in order to encompass 
the requirements of a growing sectoral, international and functional constituency, a 
move that certainly favoured certain actors over others. In this sense, the 
‘weakening’ of both terminology and regulatory goals to please certain sectors can 
be understood as embodying the necessary generalisations that allow expanding 
‘meaning’ across a growingly complex environment, where the contributions 
formerly provided by governments, unions, the ILO, or the UN were perceived as 
growingly insufficient. In this sense, the idea of standardising ‘social responsibility’, 
at least discursively, not solely addressed the actions of rational profit-maximising 
firms from the developed North, but of all types of organisations and themes as 
diverse as global governance, political principles, labour and human rights, 
environmental concerns, consumer issues, community development, financial and 
operating practices and organisational behaviour irrespective of national 
background. Correspondingly, the ISO26000 ‘global’ working group emerged as a 
new form of governance even before publication, and kick-started an ongoing 
phase of ‘meta-regulatory’ convergence45. The forum became a mechanism for 
social standard-setting and an institution legitimising the actors involved. 
International organisations, such as the ILO and the OECD, not only acted as 
‘symbolic points of reference’ – providers of legitimacy rather than regulators 
themselves, a status that still denotes hierarchy and influence46 – but became 
‘forced’ participants: to stay relevant in the expanding field of international labour 
and corporate regulation, a field in which they had been historically key 
contributors, they were obliged to get involved in new initiatives and forums even 
when this involvement eroded their own sphere of influence and brought new 
                                                 
45 Rosenau, J., 2006. “Governance in the twenty-first century”, in Rosenau, J., 2006, The Study of 
World Politics, Volume 2: globalization and governance, Routledge. 
46 Bartley, T., Smith, S., 2008. Structuring Transnational Fields of Governance: Network Evolution 
and Boundary Setting in the World of Standard, Working Paper, Department of Sociology, Indiana 
University. Extracted from: http://www.indiana.edu/~tbsoc/fields.pdf (Accessed October 20th, 2010).  
  18  
actors into the arena. This is exactly what the ILO did, for instance, by launching in 
2006 its own CSR-In Focus Initiative re-connecting CSR to the principles of its 
1977 Declaration of Multinational Enterprises, organising a combined series of 
conferences on the matter with the OECD in 2008, and launching in 2009 a 
specialised Helpdesk on Social Responsibility47. 
Sahlin-Andersson observed that by 2006 private governance initiatives in 
social and environmental issues were starting to behave like ‘steering networks’: 
constellations of mobilising, policy making, reporting and monitoring bodies which 
as a group formed a regulatory framework characterised by reciprocity and co-
regulation48. Bartley & Smith49 concluded that between 2001 and 2006 private 
certification consolidated as a ‘field’, in Bourdieu’s sense of the term50, moving from 
a relatively disconnected array of actors to a coherent network with a greater 
density of interconnections, common intermediaries and a common symbolic 
references. They observed that in 2001 around 2,100 organisations in the world 
were connected to one or more ´focal´ certification associations, those whose main 
purpose is certifying labour on environmental standards. By 2006, a year after the 
ISO26000 project was launched, that number had risen to over 13,000. 
Since these years, and with the launch of the ISO project, a sequence of Memos-
of-Understanding (MoU) and compatibility documents were signed between 
international and related organisations and ISO26000: with the ILO in 2005, with 
GC in 200651 and with the OECD in 200852. Other initiatives started to articulate 
common positions in view of the coming standard: in 2007 GRI and GC published 
their first common platform and in 2010 GC adopted GRI as the recommended 
reporting framework for all its members53. In 2009, ISO signed another MoU with 
UNIDO, ‘[...] to promote sustainable development and economic growth through 
standards development and implementation...’ and assist developing countries 
integrate to the global economy54.  
                                                 
47 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---
multi/documents/publication/wcms_116336.pdf (Accessed November 13th, 2010). 
48 Sahlin-Andersson, K., 2006. “Corporate Social Responsibility: a trend and a movement, but of 
what and for what?, Corporate Governance, 6, 5, 595-608. 
49 Ibid, p30. 
50 See Bourdieu, P., 1989. “Social Space and Symbolic Power”, Sociological Theory, 7, 1, 14-25. 
51 http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=5936532&objAction=Open (Accessed October 
28th, 2010). 
52 http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=7369892&objAction=Open (Accessed October, 
28th, 2010). 
53 http://www.amsterdamgriconference.org/index.php?id=39&item=37 (Accessed November 12th, 
2010). 
54 http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1233 (Accessed October 28th, 2010). 
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It can be seen that the normative effort itself drove the generation of new 
institutional linkages, as the ‘logic of equivalence’ supplied by normative 
minimalism facilitated the creation of functional bridges between previously distinct 
projects. A good example stems from the Annex of the ISO26000 standard, which 
included a list of the current initiatives concerned with social responsibility and 
reporting, and how they compared to the core subjects of ISO26000 and its 
recommended practices. Several dozen initiatives are catalogued ranging from 
intergovernmental ones, such as the GC and the OECD's frameworks, multi-
stakeholder initiatives, such as GRI, International Frameworks Agreements and 
SAI, to single-sector initiatives, such as those provided by the ICC, the Sullivan 
Principles or tools by the WBCSD. In this regard, GRI, unsatisfied with this list 
claiming that it insufficiently explained the linkages among the different 
programmes, and did not distinguish between the more developed frameworks and 
peripheral ones55, developed its own guidance to explain how its own guidelines 
complemented ISO26000. A similar document detailing the complementarity 
between the GC principles and ISO26000 core subjects was shortly made 
available online56. Since them a myriad of documents have been written adopting a 
position in relation to the standards, revealing how something apparently trivial as 
a list in an annex, can turn into a driver of normative convergence and institutional 
association when accepted as an element of a wider universalising project. 
Furthermore, other effects of this growing ‘systemic closure’ of the social 
responsibility field are becoming evident. Closure, in Luhmannian terminology, 
refers to the state where a system becomes capable of operating according to its 
own coding: once a system is ‘closed’, a system controls its own possibilities of 
negation and the production of its own elements through a specific proposal of 
meaning, which it also uses to interpret the environment57. In the context of this 
paper, this would mean that a new dyadic code of ‘socially responsible/not socially 
responsible’ is accepted and starts to structure communication, leading to the re-
interpretation of external and internal phenomena through this lens. This is case for 
the ILO and organised labour, for example, which can be now evaluated to behave 
more or less ‘socially responsibly’, and where labour regulation itself can now be 
                                                 
55 Comments by the GRI on the final draft of the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard, submitted August 
15th, 2010. See documents in: 
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/9781660/x_Comments_received_on_ISO_FDIS_26000.zip?func=
doc.Fetch&nodeid=9781660 (Accessed November 1st, 2010). 
56 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/UNGC_ISO_DRAFT.pdf (Accessed 
November 5th, 2010). 
57 Luhmann, N., 1995. Social Systems, 1984, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
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understood as being a part of a wider social responsibility framework, and not the 
other way around. But closure also implies that the involved institutions evaluate 
themselves against this coding: they can conclude that they themselves are 
imperfect, that they should improve and adapt better in accordance with their own 
expectations, leading to the proposal of new institutions and discourses in order to 
increase the legitimacy of the system itself for itself. Thus, participants in the 
standardisation code ‘realise’ that they and their environment should be more 
socially responsible (transparent, accountable, representative, coherent, etc). In 
this sense ISO26000 is one expression, and the involvement of the ILO, OECD, 
UN and ITUC in it, another, of the standardisation system reproducing itself. 
   
This process is still advancing beyond the ISO Working Group. For instance, 
Consumers International, the main organisation for consumers rights and main 
representative of the sector of civil society that ISO favoured by granting it a 
separate constituency, stated on its website the importance of ISO26000 as a tool 
to increase accountability between consumers and business, adding that it ‘…is 
intended to add value and not to replace, existing inter-governmental agreements 
with relevance to Social Responsibility, such as the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and those adopted by the ILO’58. This quote is a 
case of the retrospective interpretations enabled by systemic closure. Previous 
official international norms as the UN Human Rights Declaration and ILO 
Conventions, that did not originally have any connection whatsoever with a 
posterior notion such as social responsibility or the current initiatives of private 
social standardisation, are re-interpreted as building blocks of a common 
movement. Moreover, this discourse previously drove the re-structuring of not only 
the departments, but the agenda of the ILO itself: the main concerns of its 
campaign for a ‘Fair Globalisation’ are issues such as employment promotion, skills 
development, sustainable enterprises and social dialogue, sidelining the traditional 
less liberal industrial relations categories59. And in 2002, the labour section of 
GRI’s guidelines were named ‘Labour Practices & Decent Work’, in alignment with 
the title of the 1999 ILO Agenda oriented to implement the new CLS strategy60. As 
                                                 
58 http://www.consumersinternational.org/our-work/social-responsibility/key-projects/promoting-
csr/iso-26000/key-information (Accessed November 13th, 2010). 
59 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/anniversary/90th/download/spfpresentation.ppt, Accessed 
November, 14th, 2010).  
60 See Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Version 3.0. Extracted October 26th, 2010 from:  
http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Guidelines/. 
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well, this convergence is reaching into domestic policy, where some countries, 
such as Denmark, are basing their national directive directly on ISO2600061, and 
many others plan to follow by either creating compatibility documents to adapt their 
local regulations or creating completely new norms aligned with it. 
The argument provided proposes that this reduction of inter-regime 
competition and enhanced compatibility with other private and public 
standardisation projects is a consequence of the politically-bargained ISO26000 
minimalism, outcomes difficult to conceive if ISO had maintained a closed 
technocratic stance. But normative minimalism is both a response to the increasing 
complexity generated by the opening impulse of the reviewed ISO project, and to 
the closure reflecting the system trying to be coherent with itself: in colloquial 
terms, ISO26000 has to be politically correct, technically legitimate and socially 
accepted, all the three simultaneously.  It was through the combination of its aim to 
standardise the whole conceptual field of social responsibility, via its new and 
expanded multi-stakeholder forum, and the authority of ISO within business and 
industrial regulation, that the Working Group managed to convene not only the 
major international interested parties but also a myriad of local ones. In this manner 
it became an acting platform of global and local theorisation and socialisation, not 
only of technical standard-setting. This platform constituted itself as a social and a 
political space of interaction and planning62: it allowed and reproduced the practice 
of a language, the reflexive debate over its own institutional and discursive 
contents, over its own limits and future evolution, and the critique and legitimation 
of the participants, independently from the publication of any text or document63. In 
this manner, ISO26000 accelerated closure due to facilitating systemic self-
reflection: the discussion about the system by the system. 
                                                 
61 http://www.csrgov.dk/ (Accessed November 3rd, 2010). The website not only promotes the Danish 
standard, but also refers to the GC, GRI, ISO 26000 and other principles and initiatives. The EC 
launched its own Multi-Stakeholder forum on CSR, as well as an EU-wide business initiative under 
the name of “European Alliance for CSR” (See ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-
business). 
62 Planning, for Luhmann, is a specific way of producing the self-description of a system where this 
self-description is oriented to the future. But planning therefore introduces further complexity and 
generated implementation and resistance at once. See Luhmann, N., 1995, p471. Social Systems, 
1984, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
63 Yates, J., Murphy, C., 2009. The International Organization for Standardization – Global 
Governance through voluntary consensus, Abingdon: Routledge; Heires, M., 2008. ‘The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)’, New Political Economy, 13, 3, 357-367; 
Schwartz, B., Tilling, K., 2009. “’ISO-lating’ Corporate Social Responsibility in the Organizational 
Context: a Dissenting Interpretation of ISO 26000”, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Management, 16, 289-299; Castka, P., Balzarova, M., 2007. ‘A critical look on 
quality through CSR lenses – Key challenges stemming from the development of ISO 26000’, 
International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management, 24, 7, 738-752. 
 





This brief analysis unveils several difficulties attached to global ‘policy-making’ 
when addressing themes beyond traditional politics and nation-state regulation. 
Through this case, it is suggested that socially-oriented global governance faces 
the difficulty of balancing the ‘globality’ of its aims with distinct sources of 
legitimacy. When ISO faced this struggle, it became evident that a complicated and 
even inverse relationship arose between technocratic expertise, democratic 
principles and market rationality, a relationship often assumed to be unproblematic. 
Such difficulties turn more evident the more encompassing a given standard 
intends to be, as is the case with the ambitious ‘triple-bottom line’ of the global 
sustainability discourse, attempting to unify in a coherent and applicable discourse 
(liberal) economic logic, social protections and environmental concerns.  
Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson suggested that transnational governance 
mechanisms expand in part by a self-reinforcing spiral of distrust which is fuelled 
by three specific institutional forces: the absence of a formal authority or holder of 
legitimacy in the transnational arena, which must be compensated, the authority 
attributed to science and technical expertise, and the demands arising from the 
expansion of deliberative democracy64. These forces support an understanding of 
governance as a system of rule that is more dependent on inter-subjective 
meaning than on sanctioned constitutions or treaties65, which in respect to many 
issues are mere statements of intention without any organisational resources or 
substance. In this sense, the legitimacy and relevance of new global policy-making 
initiatives, such as ISO26000, rest on their capacity to embed their standardisation 
projects with recognised traits that make them ‘meaningful’ both locally, but 
specially, globally: science is one of them, universal human values is the other. 
                                                 
64 Djelic, M., Sahlin-Andersson, K., 2006, p380. “Institutional dynamics in a re-ordering world”, in 
Djelic, M., Sahlin-Andersson, K. (Eds), 2006, Transnational Governance – Institutional Dynamics of 
Regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
65 Rosenau, J., 2000. “Governance, order and change in world politics” in Rosenau, J., Czempiel, 
E., (Eds), 2000, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 1992, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This author doubted that any form of global governance of 
the issues involved in sustainable development would ever manage to achieve sufficient consensus 
against empirical findings, and balance the impact of economic development, the policies put in 
place to govern them, and the demands stemming from the global discourse. See Rosenau, J., 
2006, p154. “Global governance as disaggregated complexity”, in Rosenau, J., 2006, The Study of 
World Politics, Volume 2: globalization and governance, Abingdon: Routledge. 
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Hence, it would appear that global policy-making faces a Luhmannian 
dilemma of either sacrificing the effectiveness of specialisation or hampering 
making ‘global’ sense, an unwelcomed conclusion to both technocrats and 
cosmopolitans promoting global solutions or global ethics. This then invites 
questioning the limitations of any non-state policy-making arrangements reluctant 
to agree on inclusive, albeit minimalist, principles, which reflect the political 
compromises across different programmes, parties and scales. Alternatives to such 
‘politics’ of course exist: the un-democratic exclusion of certain actors from 
decision-making, the dominance of a ‘world culture’, some form of isomorphic 
technical-economic hegemony or global liberalism66, or, as ever, force. Instances 
such as ISO26000 show the uncomfortable contradictions that articulating liberal 
politics with liberal economic effectiveness will certainly keep posing in the near 
future as struggles to govern and promote values and the rule of law stretch 



















                                                 
66 Meyer, J., 2000. “Globalization: Sources and Effects on National States and Societies”, 
International Sociology, 15, 2, 233-248; Tickell, A., Peck, J., 2003. “Making global rules: 
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